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Control of the Syrian Airspace 
Russian Geopolitical Ambitions and Air Threat Assessment 
Can Kasapoğlu 
Russia has mounted its anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) footprint in the Levant and 
also boosted the Syrian Arab Air Defense Force’s capabilities. Syrian skies now 
remain a heavily contested combat airspace and a dangerous flashpoint. Moreover, 
there is another grave threat to monitor at low altitudes. Throughout the civil war, 
various non-state armed groups have acquired advanced man-portable air defense 
systems (MANPADS), which pose a menacing challenge not only to the deployed 
forces, but also to commercial aviation around the world. In the face of these threats, 
NATO needs to draw key lessons-learned from the contemporary Russian opera-
tional art, and more importantly, to develop a new understanding in order to grasp 
the emerging reality in Syria. Simply put, control of the Syrian airspace is becoming 
an extremely crucial issue, and it will be a determining factor for the war-torn 
country’s future status quo. 
 
Russia’s integrated air defense footprint 
in Syria was mounted gradually following 
its intervention, which began in September 
2015. That year, the Armed Forces of the 
Russian Federation established the Hmei-
mim Air Base in the Mediterranean gate-
way city of Latakia, adjacent to the Basel 
al-Assad International Airport, named after 
the late heir apparent of Hafez al-Assad. 
Russia “Flying High” in the 
Syrian Airspace 
When Turkey downed a Russian Su-24 
aircraft in November 2015, Moscow 
responded by beefing up its surface-to-air 
missile (SAM) capabilities in Syria. In this 
regard, advanced defensive strategic weapon 
systems, such as the S-400s and the S-300V4s, 
were deployed to the Hmeimim Air Base. 
This formidable posture was reinforced 
by high-end offensive assets, such as SS-26 
Iskander short-range ballistic missiles and 
Su-35 air superiority fighters. In addition, 
Russian tactical bombers (e.g., Su-34s) 
started carrying air-to-air missiles during 
their missions. Finally, the Krasukha-4 elec-
tronic warfare system, which almost blinded 
eastern Ukraine, was also spotted in Syria 
in 2015. All in all, NATO’s Supreme Allied 
Commander Europe at the time, General 
Philip Breedlove, depicted the Russian 
efforts as an attempt to build an “A2/AD 
bubble” in the Eastern Mediterranean. 
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Strikingly, an engagement that took place 
in late 2017 starkly illustrated the present 
status quo. On December 13, a US Air Force 
F-22 stealth fighter deployed flares against 
two Russian Su-25s. While Washington ex-
plained that it was the Russians who crossed 
over the east of the Euphrates, Moscow in-
sisted that the F-22 violated the de-conflic-
tion zone westwards, and an Su-35 air 
superiority fighter confronted it to protect 
the two Su-25 attack aircraft. Regardless of 
which argument was accurate, the political-
military exchange highly resembled that 
of two neighbor states quarreling over a 
disputed national airspace issue.  
Furthermore, one particular incident 
encouraged the Russians to invest more 
in the Syrian air defenses. On April 7, 
2017, the US Navy’s USS Porter and USS Ross 
Arleigh Burke-class destroyers struck Syria’s 
al-Shayrat Air Base from the Eastern Medi-
terranean waters with a salvo of 59 Toma-
hawk Land Attack Missiles. The attack came 
after the regime’s chemical weapons use 
in the town of Khan Shaykun, Idlib. At the 
time, the global defense community had a 
huge debate discussing whether the Russian 
air and missile defense contingent was ca-
pable of intercepting the incoming Toma-
hawk Block IVs or not, or whether Moscow 
sent orders not to do so to avoid an esca-
latory response. 
Following the US strike, which targeted 
one of the most important bases of the 
Syrian Arab Air Force – where some Rus-
sian platforms were also deployed, but ap-
parently Moscow was warned right before 
the operation – the Russian Defense Minis-
try bluntly announced its plans to bolster 
the Syrian air defenses. Some argue that 
the recent downing of the Israeli F-16I was 
a result of these efforts. 
Downing of the Israeli F-16I: 
Putting an End to the Operation 
Orchard Legacy? 
A major breakthrough in the Syrian Arab 
Armed Forces’ air defense capabilities 
would produce key geopolitical results that 
would go well beyond “simple” military 
modernization. Robust air defenses had 
already transformed the Syrian skies from a 
permissive combat airspace into a contested 
combat airspace. Such a shift could limit 
Israel’s surgical interventions. This would 
challenge “the Begin doctrine,” namely pre-
venting hostile strategic weapons prolif-
eration beyond borders, which culminated 
with Operation Orchard, when Syria’s 
secret nuclear reactor in Deir ez-Zor was 
hit by the Israeli Air Force in 2007. 
Nevertheless, Israeli military planners 
can come up with a solution such as using 
tactical ballistic missiles or guided rockets 
to intervene in Syria. An alternative might 
be to assign the newly received F-35 stealth 
multirole fighters. However, the oppor-
tunity to test new SAM systems on F-35s, 
which will form the backbone of NATO’s 
future tactical aviation, could whet the 
Russians’ appetite, and could lead to addi-
tional arms transfers to Damascus. In fact, 
the Arab-Israeli conflicts during the Cold 
War offered good opportunities to make 
comparative assessments between Ameri-
can and Soviet weaponry. Moscow, having 
already tested more than 200 new weapon 
systems on the Syrian battleground, would 
not refrain from such a bonanza, which 
would also pave the way for further lucra-
tive arms sales. Besides, since state orders 
constitute a substantial proportion of the 
Russian defense industry’s workload at 
present, Syria is serving as an important 
reference for the Kremlin’s military mod-
ernization plans. 
“Minefields” at Low Altitudes: The 
Cases of the Su-25 and the T-129 
As explained earlier, apart from the defen-
sive strategic weapon systems risk at high- 
and mid-altitudes, the lower echelons of 
the Syrian airspace are also dangerous.  
On February 3, 2018, on a mission in 
Idlib, a Russian Su-25 attack aircraft was 
downed, allegedly by MANPADS fire. Hay’at 
Tahrir al Sham, an al-Qaeda-affiliated group, 
claimed the responsibility. 
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MANPADS in the hands of terrorists 
pose a grave threat not only to military 
platforms, but also to commercial aviation. 
These weapons are shoulder-fired missiles 
– weighing some 15–20 kg – used 
against low-flying aircraft. MANPADS tech-
nology has achieved impressive improve-
ments, in particular in the guidance sys-
tems and in avoiding countermeasures. 
Depending on certain technical features, 
a MANPADS’ engagement envelope – the 
danger zone – is at an altitude of 10,000–
15,000 feet, and it has a range of 3 to 7 kilo-
meters.  
It is estimated that up to 750,000 
MANPADS might be present in the world. 
Open-source intelligence suggests that a 
broad array of non-state armed groups have 
managed to lay their hands on these danger-
ous weapons throughout the Syrian Civil 
War. Interestingly, although many of the 
Syrian Arab Army’s stockpiles were looted, 
the types of MANPADS that Damascus did 
not possess, such as the Chinese FN-6, were 
also spotted in Syria, hinting at the possibil-
ities of a dangerous gray and black market 
flow. 
The Turkish T-129 incident is another 
case showing that flying at low altitudes in 
the Syrian airspace resembles an infantry 
platoon walking through a minefield. 
On February 10, 2018, Turkey lost a T-129 
attack helicopter during Operation Olive 
Branch. There is no visible sign of MAN-
PADS having been used in Turkey’s gunship 
crash. Yet, there is the likelihood that the 
attack helicopter might have been hit by 
anti-aircraft gunfire. 
In fact, rotary-wing platforms have 
become more vulnerable in contemporary 
hybrid conflicts. Since Operation Iraqi Free-
dom in 2003, each loss has made helicopter 
survivability in modern warfare more ques-
tionable. Keeping these platforms safe in 
the 21st century’s contested airspaces is 
hard. After all, performing evasive maneu-
vers while flying very low in order to avoid 
MANPADS makes helicopters more prone to 
anti-aircraft gunfire. Unfortunately, there 
is no silver bullet solution for choppers, or 
even for light attack aircraft. 
Syria As a Military Testbed 
All in all, there is a significant showdown 
over the Syrian airspace, and the winner(s) 
will shape the country’s future. What did 
not happen in and around this airspace? Fol-
lowing is a brief recap of the past six years. 
In 2012, a Turkish RF-4E Phantom 
reconnaissance aircraft was downed by the 
Syrian air defenses; in the same year, the 
rebels downed a Syrian Mig-23 fighter air-
craft at low altitude, marking the first 
aircraft loss for the regime. Again in 2012, 
the regime launched Scud missiles onto the 
rebel positions in Aleppo. Consequently, 
NATO deployed three missile defense con-
tingents in Turkey. In 2013, the Turkish Air 
Force downed a Syrian Mi-17 helicopter. 
In 2014, an Israeli Patriot downed a Syrian 
Su-24 over the Golan Heights. In the same 
year, a Jordanian F-16 crashed near Raqqa 
– some claimed it was downed by ISIS – 
and the pilot was later executed, tragically. 
In 2015, notably, a NATO nation, Turkey, 
downed a Russian aircraft violating its 
airspace. Then, Russia established a robust 
A2/AD posture in Syria. In the same year, 
Assad’s forces allegedly downed an Ameri-
can MQ-1 Predator drone over Latakia. In 
2016, Russia sent the Admiral Kuznetsov air-
craft carrier to the Eastern Mediterranean 
for combat operations, which was a highly 
symbolic move signaling to the West. In 
2017, the United States hit Syria’s al-Shayrat 
airbase with Tomahawks, downed a Syrian 
Su-22 attack aircraft, and intercepted sev-
eral Iranian drones. 
Finally, at the time of writing, a Russian 
Su-25 attack aircraft, an Israeli F-16I multi-
role fighter, a Turkish T-129 attack heli-
copter, and an Iranian surveillance drone 
were added to the record only within a 
week. All of these incidents reveal the ten-
sion in the Syrian airspace. 
Key Takeaways and Policy 
Recommendations 
Firstly, the Syrian skies can no longer be 
assessed through the lens of Operation 
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Orchard. Rather, Moscow’s A2/AD contin-
gent in the country, which remains there 
to stay for at least half a century, along with 
the boosted Syrian air defense capabilities, 
have turned the country’s permissive air-
space into a heavily contested one. Under 
these conditions, no Western aircraft – 
even the high-end stealth platforms such as 
the F-22s and the F-35s – can fly confidently 
within the engagement envelopes of the SAM 
systems in Syria, let alone non-stealth ones. 
Furthermore, Russia has come into the 
picture as the new boss in the Syrian air-
space – definitely so in the western axis 
of the country. For example, Ankara, being 
a NATO member, had to pursue top-level 
diplomatic talks with Moscow before 
launching Operation Euphrates Shield to 
al-Bab, and Operation Olive Branch to Afrin. 
This tellingly sets forth the new strategic 
balance. Moreover, the Russian contingent’s 
A2/AD capabilities have provided it with the 
key advantage of influencing the operational 
tempo of the Turkish Air Force during 
cross-border campaigns. 
The Syrian Arab Army vitally needs the 
Russian air cover and close air support to 
operate, whereas the Syrian Arab Air Force 
and the Syrian Arab Air Defense Force 
strongly depend on the Russian defense 
industry to sustain their combat readiness. 
Strikingly, at the time of writing, the 
head of the State Duma Defense Commit-
tee, Vladimir Shamanov, hinted at the pros-
pects of denying the Syrian airspace to for-
eign actors that did not receive permission 
from Damascus. Although it is not the offi-
cial stance of Moscow, yet, the idea was 
speculated upon by one of the most influ-
ential figures of the Russian military estab-
lishment. Thus, the operational security of 
Operation Inherent Resolve might become 
problematic, should the tensions between 
the West and Russia continue to mount. 
Secondly, NATO’s decades-long dichoto-
my of eastern and southern flanks has been 
militarily rendered abortive. Simply put, 
many of the Russian weapon systems that 
the Baltic States might be worrying about 
have had their combat debuts in Syria. The 
Russian military-industrial complex is now 
able to test the detection and tracking 
limits of their radar systems, sensors, and 
integrated air defenses on various NATO air-
craft in the Syrian front. In addition, Rus-
sian military planners now better under-
stand the comparative analyses between 
several key platforms, including the US Air 
Force’s F-22s and the Russian Su-35s (and 
the recently deployed Su-57s), under real 
battlefield conditions. 
Consequently, NATO needs a holistic 
strategy to cover both flanks, and even 
more importantly, a thorough intelligence 
effort to understand the real meaning of 
Moscow’s military scorecard in Syria. After 
all, open-source pieces of evidence suggest 
that, as of late summer 2017, the relatively 
small Russian Air Force group managed to 
strike some 90,000 targets and flew approxi-
mately 28,000 missions with negligible 
losses. According to Russian defense ex-
perts, this marked a true breakthrough, 
keeping in mind that the Soviets lost one 
combat aircraft on average for every 750 
sorties flown in Afghanistan. 
Thirdly, despite the emphasis on stra-
tegic weapon systems, tactical game-
changers below 10,000–15,000 feet should 
be monitored carefully, especially regarding 
threats from terrorists and foreign fighters. 
The efforts in hunting down the Libyan 
MANPADS following the 2011 intervention 
were not effective. Some of these low-alti-
tude air defense weapons, or their compo-
nents, were spotted across a broad axis, 
ranging from Mali to Egypt. Furthermore, 
when it comes to Syria, we are talking 
about advanced MANPADS. 
All in all, the geopolitical showdown 
over the Syrian airspace will determine the 
future of the war-torn country, as well as 
the further fallout for regional and global 
security. 
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